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Editorial 
Joachim Duyndam & Renée van Riessen 
By exception, the present issue of the Journal of the Dutch-
Flemish Levinas Society (Mededelingen van de Levinas Stud-
iekring), volume 16, 2011, is published in English. Covered 
by the theme ‘Interreligious Dialogue’, the volume at hand 
includes contributions to the International Memorial Con-
ference in Honour of Nasr Abu Zayd, organized by the Uni-
versity of Humanistic Studies in Utrecht, The Netherlands, 
on April 14-15, 2011. Although only a few of the conference 
papers are explicitly related to Levinas’ thought, the central 
theme of the memorial conference – How Can a Humanistic 
Approach to Islam Be Realized? – is in the spirit of Levinas’ 
philosophy as it can be articulated as a ‘humanism of the 
other’ and ‘intercultural / interreligious dialogue’. There-
fore, the editors have considered it justifiable to share the 
present variety of interesting papers with the Levinas-
minded scholarly audience of this Journal. Despite their 
different cultural and religious roots, Nasr Abu Zayd (1943-
2010) and Emmanuel Levinas (1906-1995) have their hu-
manism of the other – or should we say: humanism to the 
other – in common, including their striving for peaceful dia-
logue and careful interpretation.  
The editors are indebted to Coby van Pagée and Annelot de 
Wit for their assistance in editing this volume. 
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Rereading the Qur’an: A Muslim’s Woman 
Perspective● 
Elham Manea
1
  
 
‘It is the Qur’an that we have to deal with, if we are to succeed 
in paving the path for a humanistic Islam. Qur’an has been 
treated as synonyms to God. It is as if we dared to question the 
nature of Qur’an, we are questioning our faith in God, and at 
the same time we declare our rejection of Islam itself. Qur’an 
in this sense is the Church of Islam. Separating this church of 
Islam from state’s laws and jurisprudence is imperative; not 
only for the future of a humanistic Islam, but also for institut-
ing legal gender equality.  
If there is one sphere that illustrates this statement in no 
compromising manner, it would be the private sphere of the 
family in Arab societies. The reason is straightforward; fami-
ly laws, with the one exception of Tunisia, are justified and 
based on religious provisions! All of them!  
Perhaps this fact can clarify to a great extent the confusion 
that many here in Europe feel when approaching cosmopoli-
tan Arab societies such as Egypt, Lebanon, or Syria. On the 
one hand, these states took drastic steps to modernize their 
legal structures after their independence; on the other hand, 
they left the religious provisions governing the family 
sphere untouched. They tried to codify some of these provi-
sions; making them more ‘friendly’ to women; but the basis 
remained religious, and thus inherently biased towards 
women.  
Notice that I did not use the word Islamic provisions here. I 
said religious provisions. The reason is also surprising. Arab 
women are left to the laws of their respective religions to 
govern their family relations. A Syrian Orthodox, a Lebanese 
Maronite, or an Egyptian Copt who would like to divorce her 
husband will be subject to the religious laws set by their 
respective churches. And these, just like their Islamic coun-
terparts, are not exactly gender friendly. This clarifies the 
joke told to me by Syrian women’ activists in a dinner I at-
tended in Damascus in mid summer 2007. The activists, 
representing a wide spectrum of NGOs of different ideologi-
cal backgrounds (Islamic, Christian, and secular) said while 
laughing: “The Vatican and Arab countries disagree on every-
thing. But when it comes to our rights (in international con-
ferences), they miraculously agree!” Why have Arab societies 
refrained from modernizing their family laws and steering 
them from their religious basis is the question I pose in a  
● This paper is adapted from a chapter 
from Manea, Elham, Ich will nicht mehr 
schweigen: Der Islam, der Westen und die 
Menschenrechte, Freiburg: Herder Verlag, 
2009.  
1 Elham Manea is an Associate Professor at 
the Political Science Institute, Zürich Uni-
versity. She is author of several books and 
novels. Her latest academic book will be 
published by Routledge, London, in Sum-
mer 2011 under the title: The Arab State 
and Women’s Rights: the Trap of the Author-
itarian Governance. 
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book that is due to be published this summer by Routledge 
in London. Answering it goes beyond the scope of this note.  
But how Qur’anic verses are interpreted and how religious 
provisions are being applied, contribute greatly to the prob-
lem of women in Arab societies. No reformation of Islam is 
possible, in my opinion, without dealing with the gender 
question. And a real reformation has to acknowledge the 
shortcomings and limits of Islamic stipulations regarding 
women. Acknowledging that will pave the way for adopting 
positive and civil laws, that best protect the woman as a 
human equal to man in dignity and rights.  
 In the next part, I will present how the issue of women’s 
rights has been constantly discussed in a ‘safe boundary of 
thinking’. Two examples of discourses will be presented, the 
first acknowledge that there is a problem and tries to find a 
solution through new interpretation of Qur’anic verses, and 
the second denies that there is a problem to deal with, and 
instead urges women to accept God’s orders and submit to 
their natural duty. In a second phase I will then try to step 
out of that safe boundary and set the mode for a counter 
humanistic argument.  
Women’s rights: Talking from a Safe Boundary of Thinking 
Two discoursed can be discerned in discussing the issue of 
women’s rights in Islamic societies from a ‘safe boundary of 
thinking’. Both argue that ‘Islam respects women’s rights and 
has always guaranteed them; the problem has mainly to do 
with the society that is interpreting or implementing these 
rights. The problem has to do with the people themselves’. 
A Reformist Argument  
The first discourse is espoused by Muslim reformers and 
scholars, who recognize that women are discriminated 
against within Islamic legal tradition and seek to find an en-
lightened interpretation of Qur’anic verses. In this endeavor 
they use modern interpretations techniques and activate the 
Islamic principle of Igtihad.  
Muslims, according to this paradigm have to re-read their 
Qur’anic text and separate its message from their traditions 
and patriarchal structures. That was the argument of some 
of the early reformers of the 19th and early 20th Century and 
it is still the argument of some enlightened reformers today. 
The discourse is featured with heterogeneity especially in 
the type of approaches used and the scope of reforms they 
call for. Baring this heterogeneity in mind, I will use the 
scholar Amina Wadud as an example to illustrate her  
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2 Wadud, Amina,, Qur’an and Woman: Re-
reading the Sacred Text from a Woman’s 
Perspective, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1999, pp. 8-9. 
3 Ibid, p. 102 
argument,. 
Amina Wadud is a modern scholar who seeks to reform Is-
lam from a feministic perspective. Her arguments, im-
portant as they are, were made from a safe boundary of 
thinking, which did not question the nature of Qur’an as 
God’s literal word.  
Amina argues that the “Qur’an acknowledges that men and 
women function as individuals in society. However there is no 
detailed prescription set on how to function, culturally. Such a 
specification would be an imposition that would reduce the 
Qur’an from a universal text to a culturally specific text – a 
claim that many have erroneously made. What Qur’an pro-
poses is transcendental in time and space.”2 
Using hermeneutical techniques, Wadud tried in her book 
entitled ‘Qur’an and Woman: Rereading the Scared Text from 
a Woman’s Perspective’, to prove that the Qur’an has indeed 
provided a universal message, treating man and woman as 
different but equal individuals. And she came to the conclu-
sion that “they have the same rights and obligations on the 
ethico-religious level, and have equally significant responsibil-
ities on the social-functional level”.3  
Wadud does have a point in arguing that the Qur’an treated 
man and woman as equal in front of God in their religious 
responsibilities and treatment in the afterlife. There are 
several Qur’anic verses that corroborate this argument. 
Nevertheless it is very difficult to draw the same conclusion 
when we talk about the social functional level. Often, when 
it concerns this level, when it involves rights in family and 
society, the Qur’an does not provide a universal message, 
certainly not for a woman living in the 21st century. I will 
come back to this point later.  
An Islamist Argument  
The second discourse argues that the problem with women 
has to do with the Muslims themselves, who are not Muslims 
enough. This has been the argument of the early Islamists 
like Hasan al Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brothers 
movement, and it is the argument that has been used in the 
re-islamization process that is taking place in Arab societies. 
Islam, according to this line of argument, is in no need for 
reformation. The religion is there, pure and solid, and it is 
the duty of Muslims to return to its puritanical provisions 
and doctrines, and stick to its rituals to the letter. Accord-
ingly, there is no need to seek a ‘solution’ to the problem; for 
there is no problem to start with.  
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4 Al Banna, Hasan, “The Muslim Woman”, In 
Arabic. 
This discourse insists too that Islam is not the problem. But 
unlike the reformers who, while reiterating the statement, 
try to come up with different interpretations to what they 
clearly see as problematic religious provisions; Islamists 
consider what Islam offers a woman an idealistic system 
that guarantees her dignity and protection and ‘perfectly 
suits’ her ‘natural duty’ and “biological nature”. So instead of 
seeking a new reading of Islamic text, they focus on convinc-
ing Muslim women to accept the ‘Islamic social order’ as 
they see it.  
The writing of Hasan Al Banna, the founder of the Muslim 
Brothers movement, on women is a very good example in 
this regard, for he set the tone for the discussion of women’s 
rights from an Islamist perspective in his famous tract enti-
tled “The Muslim Woman”. He argued that knowing the opin-
ion of Islam towards woman and man, their relationship 
and duties, “is not important”! “What is important, and i am 
quoting him here, is to ask ourselves are we prepared to ac-
cept the judgment of Islam”.4  
The question is vital because al Banna sees a danger loom-
ing, coming from the West: “In reality, this country and other 
Islamic countries are swamped by a cruel unruly wave of in-
fatuation with the imitation of European (way)”. And he in-
sists that Muslims have to prepare themselves “to accept 
God’s orders and prohibitions”.  
Writing the sentence “to accept God’s orders and prohibi-
tions” was necessary in my opinion. For Al Banna is very 
aware that, while Islam “elevates the status (value) of woman 
and makes her a partner to man in rights and duties”, Islamic 
provisions do discriminate between man and woman. He 
said: “But on the other hand, it should be noticed that when 
Islam took away something from the right of woman, it called 
for something better in another side; or this detracting is 
done for her benefit and well-being before anything else’.  
He justifies this discrimination by saying that it“comes from 
their natural differences, which are unavoidable (inevitable), 
compatible with the difference in the task each is conducting, 
and for the protection of the rights given to each”.  
Women’s Rights - Stepping out of the Safe Boundary of Think-
ing  
So far we have been discussing discourses that were either 
trying to provide an enlightened and a different interpreta-
tion to religious texts dealing with woman’s  
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5 This opinion has been emphasized by 
thinkers who are seeking a reformation 
from within Islam such as Abullahi Ahmed 
An-Na’im in his book “Toward an Islamic 
Reformation: Civil Liberties, Human Rights, 
and International Law, Syracuse: Syracuse 
University Press, 1990; 
position while insisting that Islam by itself is not the prob-
lem; or arguments that do not see a problem to solve and 
rather implore the Muslim woman to accept her position in 
the social hierarchy of an Islamic order. Both however never 
questioned the nature of Qur’an as God’s literal words. A 
humanistic reading of Islam seeks to approach this issue by 
stepping out of the safe boundary of thinking. It argues that 
insisting that ‘Islam is not the problem’ is counterproductive 
and rather complicates the matter, for it sets the argument 
on a defensive level. Trying to defend an ‘idea’ will reflect on 
the outcome, makes it hard to provide a rational reading of 
the problem, call it by its name, and then deal with it.  
A humanistic reading of Islam insists that a real reformation 
of Islam has to acknowledge the limits of the religious texts in 
providing solutions to the women’s problem and maintain 
that these religious texts must be seen within its historical 
context and should therefore cease to be relevant when regu-
lating the social reality of family and state in the 21st century. 
In other words, it argues for the separation of state and reli-
gion. Again, it insists that it is the Qur’an that we have to deal  
with, if we are to succeed in separating religion from state’. 
The Qur’an is the church of Islam.  
The limits of the religious texts in providing solutions are 
clear regarding the issue of women’s rights. Qur’anic verses 
did treat women as equal to men in their judgment in front 
of God in the afterlife. Verse 40:40 states: “whoso does evil 
will be requited only with the like of it; but whoso does good, 
whether male or female, and is a believer – these will be pro-
vided therein without measure”.  
”يس لِمَع نم نمؤم وهو ىثنأ وأ ٍركذ نم ًاحلاص لمع نمو اهلثم لاإ ىزُجيلاف ً ةئ
باسح ريغب اهيف نوقزري ةنجلا نولخدي كئلوأف“   
My interest, however, pertains to the verses that concern a 
woman’s status in this life. Put simple, on the social level 
Qur’anic verses discriminated against women to the ad-
vantage of man. This discrepancy is obvious in verses regu-
lating family relations, sexual relations within marriage, 
inheritance, and testimony - the culmination of which points 
to the end that, indeed, there are clear inconsistencies be-
tween Qur’anic provisions and the 1948 Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights and the Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) of 
1987 in relation to the status of women.5  
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6 The Holy Qur’an: Arabic Text with Eng-
lish Translation & Short Commentary, 
Edited by Farid, Malik Ghulam, London: 
Islamic International Publications Lim-
ited, 2002, p. 196; The Holy Qur’an, 
Tafsier Al Imamien al Jalalien, in Arabic, p. 
84; Ghalib, Hanna, Thesaurus of Arabic: 
An Encyclopedic Reference of Synonyms, 
Antonyms & Espressions, BeirutÖ 
Librairie du Liban Publishers, 2003,p.486  
7 Mernissin, Fatima, The Political Hareem: 
Mohammad and the Women, in Arabic, 
Second edition, Damascus: Dar 
Hasad,1993, pp.196-203; Wadud, Amina, 
Qur’an and Woman: Rereading the Sacred 
Text from a Woman’s Perspective, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1999, pp.74-78. 
These inconsistencies are not theoretical when it concerns 
women’s daily lives. Qur’anic verses have been translated into 
family laws that sanction the inferior rol of women in family 
and society. They are very much anchored in the most basic 
unit of society – the family - and its relations, perpetuating a 
system of inequality between husband and wife. A serious 
reformation will have to address this inequality. The ques-
tion is therefore how do we address this inequality?  
One way of addressing the problem is to resort to a selective 
reading of Qur’an trying to come up with an argument sup-
porting gender equality in family relations. The problem 
with this method is that once it makes Qur’an its point of ref-
erence it is bound to be confronted with the passages that do 
not corroborate the equality argument.  
Let me use Qur’anic verse 34 of Sura 4 as an example of 
what I just stated above. Verse 34 is a long verse, but I want 
to focus on one part of it which says: “(…) Ermahnt 
diejenigen, von denen ihr Widerspenstigkeit befürchtet, und 
entfernt euch von ihnen in den Schlafgemächern und schlagt 
sie. Wenn sie euch gehorchen, dann wendet nichts Weiteres 
gegen sie an. Gott ist erhaben und groß“  
 ” حجاضملا يف نهورجهاو نهوظُعف َنهَزوُشن نوفاخت يتلالاو
 ..نهوبرضاو”   
This part of verse 34 provides the ‘disciplinary’ steps in 
which a husband can follow in the case of his wife’s noshouz 
- disobedience. The word Noshouz has generally been de-
fined as rising against the husband, deserting him, or resist-
ing him.6 Fatima Mernissi emphasized her opinion that this 
type of noshouz covers also a woman’s rejection of her hus-
band sexual demands, while Amina Wadud was of the opin-
ion that the word means disruption of marital harmony.7  
Whether the word means rising against the husband or dis-
ruption of martial harmony, the question that many Mus-
lims have been struggling with has been ‘how to deal with 
the fact that this verse allows the man to beat his wife as a 
last disciplinary measure?’  
While the reactions differ, two approaches are discernable. 
The first is more common and tries to justify it; the second is 
scholarly and attempts to explain it using a hermetical ap-
proach, but often falls in a denial syndrome. Both are miss-
ing the point!  
The first has been propagated by male Muslim preachers 
and scholars alike who would argue along the following line: 
beating a wife is the husband’s last resort that he can use if 
his wife insists on disobeying him. Women are irrational, and  
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8 Wadud, Amina, ibid; Zentrum für 
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Wort und seine große Wirkung, Cologne, 
2005. 
9 Wadud, Amina, ibid, p. 76.  
sometimes they do not see where their interests are. They can 
jeopardize the wellbeing of their family. A man, being rational 
as he is, has sometimes no resort to this method to bring her 
to reason! But if he did that, there are conditions as to how he 
beats her. He should not slap her on her face! No, he should 
not. He should not leave any marks on her body. No, he should 
not. Other than that, he can of course beat her!  
Every time I hear this line of argument, my blood pressure 
raises. But this type of discourse is common in Saudi, Ku-
waiti, Yemeni, or even Egyptian TVs. In many religious pro-
grams the issue will be discussed within the above parame-
ters to justify the Qur’anic verse. And of course part of the  
argument is to make sure to mention that Mohammad the 
Prophet never used force against his wives and that he re-
peatedly called on Muslim men not to beat their wives! Logic 
is not the basis on which this type of justification is founded.  
The second reaction is scholarly, conducted mainly by femi-
nists Muslim Scholars, and is meant to find an explanation 
for the verse from a hermeneutic perspective. The work of 
Amina Wadud in her book “Qur’an and Woman” and that of 
a group of scholars in their book “Ein einziges Wort und 
seine grosse Wirkung” falls within this category.8  
The two books mentioned above tried to shed doubts on the 
word “daraba” – beating- saying that it may have a different 
meaning than, well, beating. Amina Wadud, for instance, 
argued that in some references this word ‘does not neces-
sarily indicate force or violence’, rather it has been used to 
indicate setting an example or leaving.9  
Although this type of academic research deserves to be 
highly commended for seeking a different feministic ap-
proach to understanding the Qur’an, there are limits as to 
how far one can go with this approach.  
Try hard as you may, the meaning of the word ‘beating’ will 
not change, especially if read within the context of the whole 
verse itself. A man trying to get his wife to stop disobeying 
him may use several methods, the last of which is the hard-
est - beating her. If the woman ‘obeyed’ him, then he should 
stop these measures.  
Try hard as you may, the meaning of the verse can not be 
separated from its historical context which provided the 
reason why this verse was issued and formulated in the first 
place. It came after a woman, hit by her husband,  
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10 Mernissi, Fatima, pp. 179-203. 
11 Abu Zaid, Nasr Hamid, Mohammed und 
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Zukunft des Islam, Freiburg: Herder 
Verlag, 2008, p.160. 
complained to the Prophet. The latter decided to punish 
him, but the verse then came setting the course as to how to 
deal with this case.  
Fatima Mernissi provided an excellent account of the diffi-
cult political situation the Prophet was facing, even within 
his own Muslim community. His rejection of using violence 
against women only complicated his position and caused 
much resentment against him. The verse was necessary to 
calm down the angry Muslim men.10 
Our Egyptian thinker Nasr Hamid Abu Zaid was a matter of 
fact about this issue when he said that: “Daraba is correctly 
translated as beating; it is allowed according to this verse if 
only in a certain context. One sees that this verse is quite 
obviously directed to a male audience. The Koran is a text 
that is principally aimed to men, simply because it arose in a 
male dominated surroundings." 11 
In other words, because the discourse used in the verse was 
directed to men, it reflected the social context of the period 
when Mohammad lived. A context which could be described 
as male dominated, tribal and patriarchal by nature. Can one 
expect from such a social and historical context equality 
between sexes that corresponds to our current understand-
ing of gender equality? It is too much to ask for.  
Trying to find a linguistic ‘way out’ of this dilemma of 
‘daraba’ is, therefore, not convincing, not to me at least. The 
conclusion it came to, reflects rather the assumption that 
‘Qur’an can not sanction beating a wife. Hence the word beat-
ing may not have meant beating’. Denial is not a good course 
of action.  
A humanistic Islam approaches this issue differently. It does 
seek situating the verse within its historical and political 
context and provides an explanation to it. But it acknowl-
edges at the same time the limits of such an approach in our 
daily conduct. For the question that one should pose is: if we 
did indeed situate this verse within its historical and social 
contexts, what should we do next? Leave it, and say, yes 
Qur’an does contain a verse that sanction beating the wife, 
but that was a different historical period?  
That is one step in the right direction, but in itself it will not 
do. It is not enough; not when you have those who are using 
this very verse to justify domestic violence, it is necessary to 
set the lines straight. Hence, the rationality upon which a 
humanistic Islam is based on will empathize that under-
standing the historical context of this verse is one step in the 
right direction. Makingit clear at the same time that this verse  
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is not the point of reference when it comes to family relations 
is the logical step that should follow. Saying it clear and loud 
that this verse ceases to be relevant to society is the logical 
step that should follow. It ceases to be relevant to society be-
cause, quite frankly, using today’s standards; to act on this 
verse will constitute a violation of human rights. For Today, 
we consider the woman an individual, a human, equal to 
man. Today we do not expect women to obey their hus-
bands. We expect man and woman to be partners when they 
decide to establish a family. And today, we call the act of a 
man or a husband beating his partner or wife, we call it do-
mestic violence. It is considered an offence, a crime.  
To be able to argue along this line, a humanistic approach to 
Islam requires that we distinguish between two levels of the 
Islamic religion: a) a spiritual side which seeks to establish a 
connection between the individual and God; and b) a legalis-
tic and Sharia side whose provisions should cease to be a 
point of reference to our legislation.  
Often, it is this legalistic and Sharia side of religion that we 
seem to be stuck with. It is as if we are kept paralyzed and 
frozen inside a certain historical period, a bubble of time- 
unable to break away of it to the 21 century. And we are 
frozen in time for good reasons. For we seem to keep using 
the same paradigm of thinking and lines of arguments in 
approaching the most critical question that should have 
been addressed long time ago: What is the nature of Qur’an?  
Posing this question in this form will force us to step into the 
forbidden Areas of Thinking and face the church of Islam. 
Without acknowledging the human nature of Qur’an we will 
remain stuck, posing the same questions about women’s role 
in society that were asked more than one hundred years ago, 
and coming with answers that do not guarantee full gender 
equality.   
